Forms of Imposed Protection in Legal History, Especially in Roman Law by Winkel, L. (Laurens)
www.erasmuslawreview.nl Erasmus Law Review, Volume 3, Issue 2 (2010)
© LAURENS WINKEL 
FORMS OF IMPOSED PROTECTION IN LEGAL 
HISTORY, ESPECIALLY IN ROMAN LAW
Laurens Winkel*
Abstract
Imposed protection can be traced in Roman law in several forms: the application of the criterion 
of good faith (bona fi des) by the judge, especially in contractual relations. Outside this sphere a 
special legal remedy for the defendant was introduced through the exceptio doli, introduced in 
69 BC. Imposed protection is also visible in early family law since the Law of the XII Tables 
(450 BC), pertaining to children and women. Further legal measures were taken in the form 
of protective statutes (leges, e.g. Lex Cincia against impulsive donations) and in the form of 
decisions of the Senate (Senatus Consulta), e.g. the SC Vellaeanum protecting women and the 
SC Macedonianum protecting sons. In their turn the rules concerning mistake of law do have 
protective elements for groups of persons, women, minors, farmers and soldiers. All these legal 
principles stemming from Roman law spread over Europe in the long process of the reception of 
Roman law and became a part of living law until this very day.
1 Introduction
Legal measures to protect economically and socially weaker parties are supposedly a 
rather recent phenomenon in legal history. Indeed, at fi rst glance they are not clearly 
present in Roman law and cannot be found earlier than the nineteenth century. During 
the latter period, they were a necessary consequence of the blatant forms of inequality 
that resulted from the Industrial Revolution. On a legislative level, measures to protect 
weaker parties may also be understood as a reaction to the ultra-liberal ideas behind 
the codifi cations of the early nineteenth century.1 However, imposed legal protection 
sometimes takes another form that already existed in classical Roman law or that 
developed during the reception of Roman law in civil law countries.
2 Protection Through the Expanding Application of the Concept of 
Bona Fides (Good Faith)
In Roman law, economic or social inequality as such was not regarded as a reason to 
institute special legal remedies for the protection of weaker parties. However, within 
the framework of the ever-expanding number of contractual iudicia bonae fi dei, the 
judge could take forms of undue infl uence or duress into account and so protect a 
weaker party. In classical Roman law, those iudicia bonae fi dei already covered the 
most important commercial transactions, like the four types of consensual contract: 
sale (emptio/venditio), letting and hiring (locatio/conductio), partnership (societas) 
and mandate (mandatum). Other iudicia bonae fi dei, for example those following most 
forms of contractus re, like pledge (pignus),2 contract of loan for use (commodatum) 
* Professor of Legal History, Faculty of Law, Erasmus University, Rotterdam. This text is an expanded 
version of a paper ‘Feminae comme personae privilegiatae’, which was presented in French at the 54th 
session of the Société Fernand de Visscher in Antalya in September 2000.
1 For an interesting account of the behaviour of a liberal jurist in the nineteenth century, see G. Baert, 
‘François Laurent. Zijn leven, zijn tijd en zijn strijd (1810-1887)’ in J. Erauw and M. Storme (eds.), Liber 
Memorialis François Laurent (Brussels 1989) especially at 40 ff.
2 This contract of pledge provides the debtor, who gave the pledge, with the actio pigneraticia in 
personam, to be distinguished from the actio pigneraticia in rem (= actio Serviana), an actio in rem for the 
benefi t of the creditor to reclaim the pledge from third parties as well.
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and contract of deposit (depositum), were instituted by the praetor during the period 
of classical Roman law, during the fi rst 250 years of the Christian era. In this way, 
standards of good faith gradually came to be more widely applied.
 A special remedy against abuse was created by the so-called rules of laesio enormis 
(prejudice of more than half the market price), introduced by the Emperor Diocletian 
in two constitutions concerning the sale of a plot of land, in which he seemed to protect 
the vendor.3 In the Middle Ages, these constitutions were given a wider application, 
beyond the scope of contracts of sale, under the infl uence of the Aristotelian concept of 
justice, which became popular during the mid-thirteenth century. In some later national 
codifi cations, the rules concerning laesio enormis in the law of sale survive until this 
day.4
 All of this does not imply that the iudicia stricti iuris, in which the judge does not 
automatically apply standards of good faith, afforded absolutely no protection to weaker 
parties. As early as 69 BC, we fi nd such protection in the form of an exceptio doli, a legal 
remedy awarded by the praetor to the defendant in cases in which the defendant was 
treated dishonestly, such as when a debtor was absolved informally but was nevertheless 
summoned to court by the plaintiff on the grounds that the obligation still existed in the 
strict sense of the law. In such cases, the exceptio doli was granted to the defendant and 
the claim was dismissed. Somewhat later, an active legal remedy for the plaintiff was 
granted in the form of a praetorian actio de dolo.5
 Other examples include cases of duress and intimidation (metus).6 Here the praetor 
provided legal remedies in the form of a restitutio in integrum propter metum. Other 
passive and active legal remedies in these cases were the exceptio metus and a delictual 
remedy called actio quod metus causa gessum sit. This action could lead to a fi ne.7 
The difference with the application of bona fi des was that none of these legal remedies 
were ever granted automatically: the party concerned had to specifi cally request such a 
remedy during the fi rst stage (in iure) of the proceedings.
3 Protection Through Early Institutions of Family Law
The following examples of imposed protection may be found in early Roman law, but 
the notion of protection may be a later historical retro-projection. The original purpose 
of the measures may well have been to secure the authoritarian family order under the 
patria potestas, but they were subsequently understood in a different way, namely as 
protection for socially weaker persons.
 One example of this is the tutela impuberum (tutelage for children).8 In the absence 
of paternal authority, children under the age of twelve (girls) or fourteen (boys) were 
placed under the tutelage of a tutor. This form of protection was focused mainly on the 
estates of children, but it was also a consequence of the structure of the Roman family 
in the early Roman republic, where the pater familias had quasi-patrimonial rights as 
far as his wife and children were concerned. At this time, there was even a ius vitae 
necisque – the father decided on the life or death of family members under his authority. 
Excesses were not punished directly at the legal level, but only at the religious level 
by a magistrate called the censor, when he gave a nota censoria. This nota censoria 
had consequences for the religious and social position of the person concerned, as well 
3 C. 4.44.2 and C. 4.44.8.
4 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations – Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town 
1990) 259 at n. 156, with many further references. See recently, Th. Finkenauer, ‘Zur Renaissance der 
laesio enormis beim Kaufvertrag’ in Festschrift für H.P. Westermann (Cologne 2008) 183-207; R. Hardy, 
‘De iustum pretium-leer. (Nieuwe) inzichten uit de rechtseconomie, het mededingingsrecht en empirie’ 
(2010) Nederlands Juristenblad 1160-1164.
5 A. Wacke, ‘Zum dolus-Begriff der actio de dolo’ in Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité, 
3ème série, XXVII (1980) 349-386.
6 A.S. Hartkamp, Der Zwang im römischen Privatrecht (Amsterdam 1971) passim.
7 On actiones populares, see L. Winkel, ‘Quelques remarques sur l’accusation publique en droit grec et 
romain’, Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité, 3ème série, XXIX (1982) 281-294.
8 For a brief survey, see M. Kaser and R. Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht19 (Munich 2008) 334 ff.
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as indirect consequences for his legal position.9 For example, it led to infamia, which 
meant that the person in question could no longer play a role in political life and could 
never in the future become a tutor or curator.
 When the father (pater familias) died, he could appoint a tutor in his will, or one 
could be nominated by a magistrate. The fi rst appearance of this tutela impuberum was 
in the Law of the Twelve Tables, around 450 BC (Leg. XII Tab. 5.6). According to the 
relevant provisions, children under the age of twelve/fourteen could conclude contracts 
that were to their benefi t (a rule surviving until Justinian’s time, as appears from Inst. Just. 
1.25). In all other cases, the permission of the father or tutor was required. Youngsters 
over the age of twelve/fourteen, free of patria potestas, were under the guidance of a 
curator and were entitled to restitution (restitutio in integrum) when a contract was to 
their disadvantage. Moreover, an exceptio legis Laetoria10 could be raised when a minor 
was sued for a loan and when a popular action was available, that is to say, an action 
that could be raised by anyone, a so-called actio popularis against the person who had 
abused an inexperienced minor.11 Later, in the course of the reception of Roman law, the 
tutela impuberum and the cura minorum were no longer distinguished from each other, 
but they survived until the arrival of modern law for the protection of minors.12
 The tutelage of women (tutela mulieris) was connected to the disappearance of the 
old form of marriage by manus, through which a woman came under the authority of her 
husband at the same level as his children. Gaius (1.144-145 = Leg. XII Tab. 5.1) wrote:
Veteres enim voluerunt feminas etamsi perfectae aetatis sint, propter levitatem in tutelam esse. (For it 
was the wish of the old lawyers that women even those of full age, should be in guardianship as being 
scatterbrained.)
However, this form of tutelage had already almost been abolished in classical Roman 
law, as apparent from Gaius 1.190:
Feminas vero perfectae aetatis in tutela esse fere nulla pretiosa ratio suasisse videtur: nam quae vulgo 
creditur, quia leviate animi plerumque decipiuntur et aequum erat eas tutorum auctoritate regi, magis 
speciosa videtur quam vera; mulieres enim quae perfectae aetatis sunt, ipsae sibi negotia tractant et in 
quibusdam causis dicis gratia tutor interponit auctoritatem suam; saepe etiam invitus auctor fi eri a praetore 
cogitur. (There seems, on the other hand, to have been no very worthwhile reason why women who have 
reached the age of maturity should be in guardianship; for the argument which is commonly believed, that 
because they are scatterbrained they are frequently subject to deception and that it was proper for them to 
be under a guardian’s authority, seems to be specious rather than true. For women of full age deal with their 
own affairs for themselves, and while in certain instances the guardian interposes his authorisation for the 
form’s sake, he is often compelled by the praetor to give authorisation, even against his wishes.)13
This text, written in about 160 AD, clearly shows that guardianship for adult women 
was already in decline, but it is nevertheless remarkable that a century later women 
were not only no longer under tutelage but apparently also very active participants in 
commercial transactions! That is why, in the time of Diocletian, many imperial rescripts 
were addressed to women. The enigmatic aspects of these rescripts and their addressees 
have been examined by the well-known Italian Romanist Eduardo Volterra.14
 Persons with mental illness had a guardian on the basis of the Law of the Twelve 
Tables (Leg. XII Tab. 5.7a):
Si furiosus escit, adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque eius potestas esto. (When a person will be 
mentally ill, the agnate and relative must be in control of his person and of his patrimony.)
9 See further F. Grelle, ‘La “Correctio morum” nella legislazione Flavia’ in H. Temporini et al. (eds.), 
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, II,13 (Berlin, New York 1980) 340-365.
10 Sometimes referred to as Plaetoria in the past, even in Roman legal sources. The Lex (P)Laetoria dates 
from 192 or 191 BC.
11 J.A. Ankum, ‘Gab es im klassischen römischen Recht eine exceptio und eine replicatio legis Laetoriae?’ 
in G. Klingenberg, J.-M. Rainer and H. Stiegler (eds.), Vestigia iuris Romani – Festschrift Gunter Wesener 
(Graz 1992) 21-33 (also in J.A. Ankum, Extravagantes, Scritti sparsi di diritto romano (Naples 2007) 243 
ff.).
12 H. Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, Vol. I (Munich 1985) 197 ff.
13 Translation by W.M. Gordon et al. (Ithaca, NY 1988).
14 E. Volterra, ‘Les femmes dans les “inscriptiones” des rescrits impériaux’ in E. von Caemmerer et al. 
(eds.), Xenion, Festschrift P.J. Zepos, Vol. I (Athens, Freiburg/Br., Cologne 1973) 717-724. (also in E. 
Volterra, Scritti Giuridici, Vol. V (Naples 1993) 339-346).
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This is called cura furiosi: the guardian was responsible for the administration of the 
assets of the person concerned. Prodigals had also been under guardianship since the 
time of the Law of the Twelve Tables, originally only for what they had acquired ab 
intestato. This was commonly understood as cura prodigi (found in Leg. XII Tab. 5.7c, 
transmitted in D. 27.10.1 pr.). Tutors and guardians were appointed according to fi xed 
rules of family law and were under the supervision of a magistrate. If necessary, a 
magistrate nominated tutors and guardians. When the guardianship came to an end, the 
tutor or curator could be forced to render an account of his administration with the actio 
tutelae. Fraud on his part during the period he acted as a tutor or curator was sanctioned 
by a criminal accusatio suspecti tutoris, which had far-reaching consequences for the 
status of those found guilty of such fraud.15
4 Legal Protection Through Legislation and Magistrates
Apart from above-mentioned contractual protection by Roman magistrates within the 
framework of bona fi des (see section 2), namely the exceptio doli and the actio de 
dolo, the Romans adopted legislative measures to protect socially weaker groups. Thus, 
one could consider the relationship between patroni and liberti, the so-called clientela 
relationship, as another form of imposed legal protection.16 Poor Roman citizens, and 
also freed slaves, entered into special relationships with wealthy Roman citizens for 
whom they had to perform services17 in return for social and legal protection. In addition, 
the Lex Cincia – a plebiscitum18 of 204 BC – provided protection against donations made 
under social pressure.19 The regime of the Lex Cincia was aimed at protecting a donor of 
lower status who might be forced by a person of higher status to make a donation. Gifts 
in excess of a certain amount were prohibited and could only be given to certain close 
relatives (personae exceptae). Nevertheless, the sanction was again founded in the law 
of procedure, in the form of an exceptio legis Cinciae, which could be raised against a 
claim for a gift, for example when someone promised to give an amount of money in 
the form of a formal oral stipulatio. The resulting condictio or actio ex stipulatu could 
be countered by the exceptio legis Cinciae. Although the donatio was not a contract 
in classical Roman law, it could be the reason (causa) for a stipulation or a transfer of 
ownership.
 During the Roman Principate, other forms of imposed legal protection were 
established by means of decisions of the Senate (Senatus Consulta). I will mention two 
decisions that played an important role in legal history after the reception of Roman law.
 The SC Vellaeanum (46 AD) prohibited women from standing surety for other 
people’s debts. Here it is important to observe that in Roman law personal security 
was far more prevalent than real security, such as pledge and mortgage. In cases where 
a woman had stood surety in spite of the senatus consultum, she was entitled to the 
exceptio SC Vellaeani.20 The reason for this remedy was protection against possible 
constraint under which sensible women agreed to disadvantageous legal transactions. 
According to Wolfgang Ernst,21 the protective regime of the SC Vellaeanum is still 
visible in modern consumer law. He explains this by referring to German private law, 
15 Loss of status in public and private law: no possibility to be elected as a magistrate; no possibility to 
have a function on behalf of others in private law (capitis deminutio).
16 E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford 1958).
17 B. Albanese, Le persone nel diritto privato romano (Palermo 1979) 63 ff.; W. Waldstein, Operae 
libertorum. Untersuchungen zur Dienstpfl icht freigelassener Sklaven (Stuttgart 1986).
18 A decision of the lower popular assembly called concilium plebis whose decisions were binding on all 
Roman citizens since the Lex Hortensia (287 BC).
19 F. Casavola, Lex Cincia, contributo alla storia delle origine della donazione romana (Naples 1960).
20 On the indirect effect of an exceptio, see the dissertation of J.M.J. Chorus, Handelen in strijd met de 
wet (Leiden 1976) 37 ff., and the further discussion in Max Kaser, Über Verbotsgesetze und verbotswidrige 
Geschäfte im römischen Recht (Vienna 1977) passim. On the history of the SC Vellaeanum, see also D. 
Medicus, Zur Geschichte des Senatus Consultum Velleianum (Cologne, Graz 1957) especially at 29 ff.
21 W. Ernst, ‘Interzession: Vom Verbot der Fraueninterzession über die Sittenwidrigkeit von 
Angehörigenbürgschaften zum Schutz des Verbrauchers als Interzedenten’ in R. Zimmermann et al. 
(eds.), Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (Heidelberg 1999) 395-430. See also J.E. Spruit, ‘Het 
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especially BGB § 138.22 This provision indeed differs signifi cantly from the equivalent 
provision in the Dutch Civil Code (Arts. 3:40 and 3:4423), where the element of giving 
an advantage to a third person (in Roman terminology intercessio) is absent.
 The SC Macedonianum, issued during the reign of Vespasian at the end of the fi rst 
century AD, contained a prohibition on lending money to a son who was still under the 
authority of his father. Paternal authority in classical Roman law terminated only on the 
death of the father.24 The loan was not immediately void ipso iure, but a legal remedy 
was available to protect the son against a claim by the money lender, the so-called 
exceptio SC Macedoniani.
 Apart from the rules of this senatus consultum, there was the peculium, a patrimony 
at the disposal (but not ownership) of someone who was not legally independent – a son 
or even a slave – that enabled him to take part in economic activities.25 However, the 
rules concerning the peculium do not aim at the protection of the user of the peculium 
but rather his pater familias.
5 The Rules of Mistake of Law as Imposed Protection
The rules concerning mistake of law may be regarded as a form of imposed legal 
protection, not only in private law, including the law concerning delicta privata (‘delicts’ 
in Scottish and South African legal terminology), but also in criminal law, the latter 
being beyond the scope of this paper.26 Under these rules, four groups of privileged 
persons – women, minors, farmers and soldiers – could invoke a mistake of law that 
others were generally not allowed to invoke. The main authority here is a rather famous 
passage from the Digest:
D. 22.6.9 pr. Paulus liber singularis de iuris et facti ignorantia. Regula est iuris quidem ignorantiam cuique 
noce re, facti vero ignorantiam non nocere. Videamus igitur in quibus speciebus locum habere possit, 
ante praemisso quod minoribus viginti quinque annis ius ignorare permissum est. Quod et in feminis in 
quibusdam causis propter sexus infi rmi tatem dici tur. Et ideo sicubi non est delictum, sed iuris ignorantia, 
non lae duntur. (Paul in his monograph on mistake of law and of fact. It is a rule that mistake of law is 
harmful for everyone, but a mistake of fact is not. Let us see in which cases this rule applies, taking into 
account beforehand that it is permitted for persons younger than twenty-fi ve years old not to know the law. 
And this holds also for women in certain cases because of the weakness of the female. And therefore they 
are not victims when there is mistake of law and no delict.)
In other texts, soldiers (milites) and farmers (rustici) were added to the group requiring 
special protection. Soldiers are mentioned in:
Raets-besluit van Burgemeester Velleius’ in J. Van der Westhuizen et al. (eds.), Huldigingbundel Paul van 
Warmelo (Pretoria 1984) 194-215.
22 § 138 BGB: ‘(1) Ein Rechtsgeschäft das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nichtig. (2) Nichtig ist 
insbesondere ein Rechtsgeschäft, durch das jemand unter Ausbeutung der Zwangslage, der Unerfahrenheit, 
des Mangels an Urteilsvermögen oder der erheblichen Willensschwäche eines anderen sich oder einem 
Dritten für eine Leistung Vermögensvorteile versprechen oder gewähren lässt, die in einem auffälligen 
Mißverhältnis zu der Leistung stehen.’ (emphasis added)
23 BW Art. 3:40: ‘(1) Een rechtshandeling die door inhoud of strekking in strijd is met de goede zeden 
of de openbare orde, is nietig. (2) Strijd met een dwingende wetsbepaling leidt tot nietigheid van de 
rechtshandeling, doch, indien de bepaling uitsluitend strekt ter bescherming van één der partijen bij een 
meerzijdige rechtshandeling, slechts tot vernietigbaarheid etc.’ BW Art. 3:44: ‘(1) Een rechthandeling is 
vernietigbaar, wanneer zijn door bedreiging, door bedrog of door misbruik van omstandigheden is tot stand 
gekomen, etc.’
24 Even a son becoming a Roman magistrate remains under the patria potestas! For a witty account of this 
SC Macedonianum, see David Daube, ‘Did Macedo kill his father?’ (1947) Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung, 
Rom. Abt. 65, 308 ff. (also in D. Daube, Collected Studies, Vol. II (Frankfurt am Main 1991) 193-234).
25 There are many Roman legal texts on both these institutions in the Digest and Codex of Justinian. See 
J.J. Brinkhof, Een studie over het peculium in het klassieke Romeinse recht (dissertation, Nijmegen 1978). 
The talented Leiden Romanist Egbert Koops is currently preparing a new book on peculium.
26 See nevertheless the interesting text Pap. D. 48.5.39(38).2: ‘Quare mulier tunc demum eam poenam, 
quam mares, sustinebit, cum incestum iure gentium prohibitum admiserit: nam si sola iuris nostri observatio 
interveniet, mulier ab incesti crimine erit excusata.’ (A woman is excused from the crime of incest when it 
concerns a form of this crime which is only considered as such in Roman law; she is not excused from a 
form of incest according to natural law!)
160 LAURENS WINKEL 
C. 1.18.1 Imp. Antonius A. Maximo militia. Quamvis cum causam tuam agreres, ignorantia iuris propter 
simplicitatem armatae militiae adlegationes competentes omiseris, tamen si nondum satisfecisti permitto 
tibi, si coeperis ex sententia convemiri, defensionibus tuis uti. [213] (Emperor Antonius Caracalla to the 
soldier Maximus. Although you have omitted to use available ways of defending yourself, when you were 
involved in a procedure by ignorance of the law through the simplicity of those belonging to the army, I 
allow you to use your ways of defence when you did not yet comply to the sentence and your opponent has 
started to compel you to do so. [213 AD])
Simplicity of mind (rusticitas) was the reason for protection in some but certainly not 
all other cases:
C. 2.2.2 Imp. Gordianus A. Nocturno. Venia edicti non petita patronum seu patronam eorumque parentes 
et liberos, heredes insuper, etsi extranei sunt, a libertis seu liberis eorum non debere in ius vocari ius 
certissimum est; nec in ea re rusticitati venia praebeatur, cum naturali ratione honor eiusmodi personis 
debeatur. [239] (Emperor Gordianus to Nocturnus. When a special permission is not asked, it is very fi xed 
law that patrons, their parents and children cannot be summoned to court by freed men or their children. 
And in this case there is no clemency towards simplicity of mind, for one has to pay respect towards those 
persons out of natural reason. [239 AD])
Particularly interesting is the appearance in this text of the naturalis ratio, which we fi nd 
at the very beginning of the Institutes of Gaius (around 160 AD)27 as a basic principle 
of ius gentium − in Gaius’s terminology ‘natural law’.28 A freed man had summoned the 
son of his patron to appear in court in contravention of a decree of the Senate. In this 
case, stupidity or ignorance was no excuse – natural reason must teach you that you 
have to honour your patron and his family. This is a reference to the above-mentioned 
patronus-clientela relationship (see section 3).
 In the Middle Ages, these persons were sometimes called personae privilegiatae,29 
an expression most probably coined by the glossator Bulgarus30 at the beginning of the 
twelfth century, but using the old concept of privilegium defi ned by Modestinus in the 
third century AD:
D. 50.17.196 Modestinus libro octavo regularum. Privilegia quaedam causae sunt, quaedam personae. Et 
ideo quaedam ad heredem transmittuntur, quae causae sunt; quae personae sunt, ad heredem non transeunt. 
(Privileges are sometimes linked with a thing, sometimes with a person. And therefore those that are linked 
with a thing pass over to the heir, those that are linked with a person do not pass to the heir.)
It is not certain whether the expression personae privilegiatae appears in the authoritative 
Accursian gloss, Glossa ordinaria, in the mid-thirteenth century.31
27 Gaius, Inst. 1.1, reconstructed with the help of D. 1.1.9.
28 L.C. Winkel, ‘Ist die Bedeutung der gaianischen naturalis ratio von der Zeit abhängig?’ in M. Avenarius, 
R. Meyer-Pritzl and C. Möller (eds.), Ars iuris, Festschrift für Okko Behrends zum 70. Geburtstag (Göttingen 
2009) 603-609. See also M.A. Loth and L.C. Winkel, ‘Reasonableness in a Divided Society’ (2009) De Iure 
302-315.
29 Th. Mayer-Maly, ‘Error iuris’ in H. Miehsler and E. Mock (eds.), Ius Humanitatis, Festschrift A. Ver-
dross (Berlin 1980) 147-169; Th. Mayer-Maly, ‘Rusticitas’ in Studi in onore di Cesare Sanfi lip po, Vol. I 
(Milan 1982) 309-347; L.C. Winkel, Error iuris nocet, Rechtsirrtum als Problem der Rechtsordnung, Vol. 
I: Rechtsirrtum in der griechischen Philos ophie und im römischen Recht bis Justinian (Zutphen 1985) 89 
ff.
30 H.U. Kantorowicz, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law (Cambridge 1938, repr. Aalen 1969) 
246, quotes a short treatise of the glossator Bulgarus from fi rst half of the twelfth century, entitled Summula 
de iuris et facti ignorantia, where we read in lines 4-7: ‘Amplius inquiritur, an persona tua privilegio sit 
munita, ut militis, cui contra rem iudicatam subvenitur, si nondum solve rit. Similiter et minor privilegio 
gaudet, ut prediximus, et femina, que iuris ignara solvit, sublevatur, in quibus [casi bus] veterum legum 
statuta declarant.’ (Further, one asks whether your person is provided with a privilege, as the soldier who 
is helped after a sentence when he has not yet paid. In the same way a minor enjoys a privilege, as we have 
said before, and a woman who in ignorance of the law made a payment, is helped in the cases indicated by 
the provisions of the old laws.)
31 The expression is medieval, but cannot be traced exactly, see e.g. the gloss Regula est ad D. 22.6.9 pr. 
where it is missing. Canon law sources are more likely here. S. Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre (Vatican 
City 1935, repr. 1973) 166-167, says that Gratian already distinguishes between groups of persons. In later 
legal history (nineteenth century), F.C. von Savigny, Das System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Vol. III 
(Berlin 1840) 429-440 mentions the four groups, but does not use the expression personae privilegiatae. 
Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, edited by Th. Kipp, 9th edn. (Frankfurt 1906, 
repr. Aalen 1984) Vol. I, § 29, 123 ff., deals with the concept of privilegium but does not use personae 
privilegiatae either.
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6 Legal Protection in the Legislation of Justinian and its Reception
In later legal history, most of the above-mentioned forms of imposed legal protection 
were preserved in Justinian’s legislation. They were then revived during the fi rst stages 
of the reception that resurrected Roman law in its Justinianic form after the eleventh 
century, when Roman law was taught at universities, starting with Bologna in 1088. 
Territorial legislation sometimes altered the age of minority, and women were generally 
considered to be sui iuris. In some regions, however, a married woman lost full legal 
capacity, and this was often linked to the regime of matrimonial property. Grotius 
(Inleidinge I, 5, 21-23) tells us that the overwhelming power of the husband, also over his 
wife’s property, stems from ‘oude Duitsche zeden’ (old Germanic customs). Most likely 
her incapacity goes back at least to the Sachsenspiegel (I, 31, 2),32 as Grotius indicates in 
the margin of the Lund manuscript of the Inleidinge.33 In a country like the Netherlands, 
where general community of property between husband and wife was common, the 
legal incapacity of married women endured until 1957. Both the SC Vellaeanum and the 
SC Macedonianum were part of received Roman law everywhere, as were the rules for 
the protection of minors, prodigals and persons who were mentally ill.34
 Taking into account the histoire de longue durée, one may say that the oldest forms 
of legal protection are to be found in family law but that the idea of protection spread to 
all areas of patrimonial law. Apart from examples of protection from the fi eld of family 
law, the principle of good faith played a key role in other fi elds. In the ius commune, 
most probably since Donellus, all contracts gradually came under its spell, starting with 
contracts between merchants. However, at the end of the sixteenth century, even Grotius 
was still hesitant in this regard and occasionally referred to the distinction between 
iudicia bonae fi dei and iudicia stricti iuris.35 Nevertheless, one may generally assume 
that in the European ius commune all contracts gradually became contractus bonae 
fi dei.36
 The period of national codifi cation resulted in a rather formal approach to imposed 
protection. Minors, mentally disabled persons, prodigals and – in some cases – women 
remained protected, but all other forms of protection were formalised under the infl uence 
of the notion of legal equality, which was one of the main consequences of the French 
revolution, and liberalism, which was a consequence of liberté. For a considerable 
amount of time, l’égalité devant la loi prevented the courts from taking forms of 
unequal social power into account.37 It took nearly a century before more sociological 
approaches to law arose and these forms of inequality came to be studied and explained. 
This happened for the fi rst time not in France or England but in the newest industrial 
32 For an account of old Germanic customary law of the fi rst half of the thirteenth century, see J.B.M. van 
Hoek, Eipe von Repgow’s rechtsboek in beeld: observaties omtrent de verluchting van de Saksenspiegel 
(Zutphen 1982).
33 F. Dovring, H.W.F.D. Fischer and E.M. Meijers (eds.), Hugo de Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
rechts-geleerdheid (Leiden 1965) 21 at n. 1.
34 A survey of the reception of Roman law in France may be found in the works of Philibertus Bugnyon, 
Traicté des loix abrogées et inusitées en toutes les cours, terres, jurisdictions et seigneuries du Royaume de 
France (Brussels 1677) (in the collection of the University Library in Leiden) and Bernardus Autumnus, 
La conference du droict François avec le droict roman, civil et canon (Paris 1644) (in the collection of the 
University Library in Leiden). A survey of the reception of Roman law in the Netherlands appears in Simon 
van Groenewegen van der Made, De legibus abrogatis. Its third edition from 1669 (in the collection of the 
University Library in Amsterdam) was translated into English by B. Beinart and Margaret Hewett in three 
volumes (Johannesburg 1974-1987). According to Bugnyon, I, 166, women in France were not allowed to 
act in court, neither for themselves nor for others, the last without any doubt a consequence of the reception 
of the SC Vellaeanum. See also Autumnus, II, 269; Groenewegen (1669) at 486. Cf. Grotius, Inleidinge, 
I.4.7 with interesting references to the Lex Langobardorum in the surviving manuscript of Lund. See the 
edition edited by Dovring, Fischer and Meijers, supra n. 33, at 15 n. 2.
35 De iure belli ac pacis II.11.6. See L. Winkel, ‘Die Irrtumslehre’ in R. Feenstra and R. Zimmermann 
(eds.), Das römisch-holländische Recht – Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin 
1992) at 232.
36 H. Coing, supra n.12, at 410.
37 E. Griffi n-Collart, ‘L’évolution de la notion d’égalité de l’utilitarisme à l’état de providence’ in L. 
Ingber (ed.), L’ Égalité, Vol. IV (Brussels 1975) 352-371.
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country of Europe, the German Empire. Rudolph von Jhering,38 Eugen Ehrlich39 and 
Anton Menger,40 all German speaking jurists, may be mentioned here. However, legal 
equality was not the same as social and economic equality! Special attention must be 
paid to the development of imposed legal protection in nineteenth-century Europe in 
the fi eld of labour contracts. At that time, freedom of contract in the fi eld of labour 
was unveiled as fi ctitious, and collective labour contracts therefore arose in place of 
individual ones.
7 Conclusions
Many measures of modern consumer protection may be regarded as extensions and 
elaborations of the old criterion of good faith (bona fi des) in Roman contract law. The 
system of causa in contract law41 and in the regime for the transfer of ownership, and the 
further development of the causa stipulationis in Roman law42 and the aforementioned 
transfer of ownership, can serve as possible remedies for the protection of the 
underprivileged. In these areas, modern Dutch private law is still strongly infl uenced 
by Roman law.43
 The old institutions in Roman family law, which were aimed at protecting weaker 
persons, are not only part of Dutch private law but are generally present in the legal 
systems of civil law countries. However, it remains unclear whether similar common 
law institutions can also be traced back to Roman law.
38 Rudolph von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (1877-1884, many reprints), see also F. Wieacker, 
Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit, 2nd edn. (Göttingen 1967) 451 ff.
39 E. Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (Munich, Leipzig 1929). Ehrlich was also the author 
of a book entitled Beiträge zur Theorie der Rechtsquellen, Vol. I: Das ius civile, ius publicum, ius privatum 
(Berlin 1902, repr. Aalen 1970); see also M. Rehbinder, Die Begründung der Rechtssoziologie durch Eugen 
Ehrlich (Berlin 1967) who hints at the interesting link between the study of Roman law at the end of its 
practical application in Germany and the birth of legal sociology.
40 A. Menger, Das bürgerliche Recht und die besiztlose Volksklasse, 4th edn. (Tübingen 1908).
41 In this respect, the doctrine of causa is comparable with the English concept of consideration. Still 
interesting is E.M. Meijers, ‘Nieuwe bijdragen omtrent de leer der consideration en der causa’ in Meijers, 
Verzamelde Privaatrechtelijke Opstellen, Vol. III (Leiden 1955) 301-310.
42 J.G. Wolf, Causa stipulationis (Cologne, Vienna 1970) especially at 76 ff.
43 J.A. Ankum, ‘Roman law in the New Dutch Civil Code’ (1994) Casopis pro právní vedu a praxi II, 
203-225.
